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Reducing the Discount Rate
Combining the effects of health care inflation and wealth-adjusted
willingness to pay for future benefits, the undervaluation of lives saved
decades from now via current cost-benefit analysis becomes especially stark
Associate Professor Ben Trachtenberg teaches at
University of Missouri School of Law.

U

nderregulation kills. When a sensible
and effective rule is proposed but then
not implemented, society loses whatever benefits the regulation would have
provided. When those benefits take the
form of saved lives — if, for example, the rule would
have kept a carcinogen out of the workplace — failing to enact and enforce a regulation means people
die. Unfortunately, federal agencies in the United
States systematically undercount the benefits of rulemaking, causing regulators to forsake the implementation of lifesaving measures that would have been
enacted were benefits estimated more accurately. The
result is American lives lost, every year.
This article presents two arguments against the
“discounting” of future human lives as part of costbenefit analysis, or CBA. Discounting works like
compound interest in reverse to reduce benefits
achieved in the future to their present value, where
they can be compared to present costs, since (it is assumed) future benefits are worth less today. Naturally
the discount rate (percentage interest rate) employed
affects this outcome, but the point is that the rates
used by agencies today systematically undercount
benefits. Absent ethical objections to the disparate
treatment of present and future humanity, the economic calculations of CBA itself — if properly performed — counsel against discounting lives. In other
words, even if society sets aside all moral concerns
with the discounting of future generations in principle, the current practice of discounting future hu-

man lives cannot be justified even on the discounters’
own economic terms.
Our first argument is that because CBA has thus
far ignored evidence of rising health care expenditures, it underestimates the “willingness to pay” for
health and safety that future citizens will likely exhibit, thereby undervaluing their lives. Our second
argument is that until recently CBA has ignored the
trend of improved material conditions in developed
countries, and most agencies continue to ignore it
entirely. As time advances, residents of rich countries
tend to live better and spend more, meaning that a
strict economic evaluation of future lives would discount the relatively impoverished lives of present
citizens compared to the projected luxurious and
healthy existence of our expected descendents, just
the opposite of what happens in agency practice.
Because all federal regulatory agencies calculate
costs and benefits, the underregulation resulting
from improper discounting deprives Americans of
benefits in several diverse ways. By undercounting
the benefits of environmental protection, the Environmental Protection Agency deprives Americans of
clean air and clean water. By undercounting the benefits of workplace safety, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration exposes Americans to health
hazards. By undercounting the benefits of automobile accident prevention, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration increases the number of
fatal crashes. Examples are limited only by the number of federal agencies and the scope of their regula-

Copyright © 2012, Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, D.C. www.eli.org.
24 | T H E E N V I R O N M E N T A L F O R U M
Electronic copy availableReprinted
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178129
by permission from The Environmental Forum®, November/December 2012

tory mandate. Regulations concerning global climate
change, the benefits of which would be realized far
into the future, are especially impeded by overdiscounting. Until regulators correct their method for
discounting the benefits of saving human lives in the
future, the United States will continue to suffer the
fatal costs of underregulation, and agencies will remain in violation of legal requirements to maximize
net benefits.

W

hen deciding whether and how to
regulate, federal agencies evaluate
the costs and benefits of proposed
regulatory strategies, comparing one
strategy against another and against
doing nothing. Because the purpose of regulation is
often to save lives — or at least to reduce risks to life
— the benefits of many potential policies cannot be
quantified without setting a value on human life. (Although non-fatal harms are also prevented through
regulation of environmental and workplace hazards,
agencies often ignore these regulatory benefits during CBA, in part because quantifying such benefits is
complicated.) For example, imagine a potential Department of Transportation regulation providing that
any city receiving federal highway construction funds
must employ a specified number of school crossing
guards to prevent students from being struck by
cars. The costs of the regulation could be estimated
with some pretense of accuracy. How many crossing

guards do recipient cities employ today? How much
would each additional guard’s salary, fringe benefits,
and overhead cost? Although some estimation will
be necessary, a plausible number can be offered.
For this exercise, assume extra crossing guards cost
a total of $100 million yearly. The benefits of extra
guards, however, defy straightforward quantification.
Even if the sole benefit is the prevention of fatal car
accidents, the magnitude of the benefit remains unknowable — or at least not capable of being weighed
against the $100 million cost — unless the policymaker ascribes a monetary value to each life saved.
If the extra guards would save 20 lives annually, then
the value of the benefits exceeds the value of the costs
only if each life saved is valued above $5 million.
How much is it worth to save a schoolchild from
being killed by a speeding car? At some level, the
question is preposterous, unanswerable. But laws and
executive orders requiring that CBA be performed
demand a number. To calculate the value of a human
life—sometimes called the “value of a statistical life,”
or VSL — economists have attempted to determine
how persons value the elimination of risks of death.
For example, if a person would pay x dollars to avoid
a one-in-a-hundred chance of instant death, then the
person values his own life at 100-times-x dollars. To
determine a person’s “willingness to pay” to avoid a
risk, one can simply ask (i.e., collect survey data),
or one can extrapolate willingness to pay based on
real-world phenomena, such as wage premiums for
dangerous jobs. If two jobs are otherwise identical
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but one presents a one-in-a-thousand risk of death
each year for every worker, then employees at the
dangerous job should demand higher compensation.
An annual wage premium of $8,000 would imply
that workers are willing to accept the risk in exchange
for that amount (or that workers at the safe job are
willing to pay $8,000 to avoid the risk), leading to a
statistical life valued at $8 million.
With a VSL of $8 million, an agency dedicated
to workplace safety could evaluate a proposed regulation. (Recent subjects of federal analysis include
“General Working Conditions in Shipyard Employment,” “Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements,” and “Proximity Detection Systems for
Continuous Mining Machines in Underground Coal
Mines.”) Imagine that a new machine, if installed at
an especially dangerous workplace, would reduce
fatal accidents, saving five lives every year. Under a
basic CBA, federal regulators would mandate installation of the machine if it costs less than $40 million
(that is, five saved workers multiplied by the $8 million VSL). A machine priced at $41 million would
not be “cost beneficial,” and a competitor priced at
$39 million would be. The same principles apply
when agencies consider proposals about shipyard
conditions, flightcrew schedules, and mining equipment. At least, that is the basic idea.
The actual process, however, is more complicated. In addition to calculating the values of costs and
benefits, regulators must consider when costs will be
borne and when benefits will be enjoyed. A benefit
reaped today is normally worth more than the same
benefit tomorrow, and a cost incurred today normally hurts more than the prospect of an identical future cost. Because many regulations impose up-front
costs to achieve future benefits, a CBA incorporates
the “present value” of future benefits.

C

ontroversy results from the combination
of these two practices — the valuation of
statistical lives and the discounting of future benefits. The problem is that while a
dollar available today is worth more than
a dollar provided in the future, it is far less clear that
a life saved today is more valuable than a life saved
a few years from now. If one regulation can deliver
x dollars immediately and another regulation costing the same amount would take 10 years to deliver
the same dollar amount, then the first regulation
wins any CBA contest. But if one regulation saves a
schoolchild today, and another regulation costing the
26 | T H E E N V I R O N M E N T A L F O R U M

same amount would save a schoolchild 10 years from
now, which regulation should be enacted? Right or
wrong, the consensus among policymakers is that
the life saved today is indeed worth more than the
one saved in the future, and CBA practices generally discount future VSLs just as they discount future
economic benefits.
To see the potential power of discounting, let
us return to the $39 million machine. If we imagine that the machine would save one life annually
for five years — after which it would need replacement — the CBA initially seems to favor requiring
the device. The benefits are $40 million, saving five
workers’ lives at $8 million each, which exceeds the
cost by $1 million. But the entire cost of the machine
is borne today, whereas the benefits (saved lives) will
be realized only in the future. After the saved lives are
discounted to present value, the machine is no longer cost-beneficial at $39 million. Future workers are
worth less than current ones, and the further into the
future lives are saved by a regulation, the less valuable
those lives appear to agencies considering regulations
today.
Explicit discounting of future saved lives appears
in the regulatory impact analyses accompanying all
sorts of rules proposed every year. To choose but one
example, let us consider a 2010 rule concerning food
labeling enacted by the Food Safety and Inspection
Service of the Department of Agriculture. The rule
requires labels disclosing the percentage of fat in certain meat products, including ground hamburger
meat, where such labeling was previously voluntary.
The rule is expected to cost meat producers and retailers hundreds of millions of dollars. The projected benefits would appear in the form of improved
health enjoyed by meat consumers caused by greater
access to nutritional information. The agency estimated that after the labeling rules have been in force
for several years, the regulation will save about 114.5
lives annually. Accordingly, like so many regulations,
the meat-labeling rule will have up-front costs and
distant benefits, making the discount rate an important part of the CBA. The higher the discount rate,
the lower the present value of the benefits, and the
less likely such a regulation will be enacted.
The value of a statistical life chosen by the agency
will also significantly affect the result, with a higher
VSL leading to higher benefit numbers. Here, the
agency calculated a range of expected benefits, using
VSLs from $5 million to $6.5 million and discount
rates of 3 percent and 7 percent (commonly used
rates). The vastly different outcomes starkly illustrate
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the importance of the discount rate and VSL chosen
by the agency. With a VSL of $6.5 million and a discount rate of 3 percent, the total benefits are estimated to equal $5.9 billion. With a VSL of $5 million
and a discount rate of 7 percent, the total benefits
are estimated to equal $1.1 billion. In other words,
with no changes in assumptions concerning the effectiveness of food labeling in changing consumption
habits, the relationship between meat consumption
and fatal diseases, or the likelihood that industry
will obey new regulations, the estimated benefits can
nonetheless increase more than five-fold (or, from the
other perspective, decrease by more than 80 percent)
depending on procedural choices made by an agency
during the CBA process.
This regulatory impact analysis also illustrates another reason that discounting of human lives plays
such an important role when regulations are under
review. Even though the agency believed that its proposed meat-labeling rule would have benefits in addition to saving human lives, those benefits were ignored
when the agency quantified the rule’s estimated monetary benefits. As a result, for purposes of the CBA,
the value of preventing a nonfatal cancer was zero.
Similarly, in the regulatory impact analysis justifying a
recent OSHA regulation aimed at preventing crane accidents, “the agency did not estimate cost savings from
avoiding crane accidents, but only estimated monetized benefits for avoiding fatalities . . . or injuries.”
The focus on saved lives is quite common, making it
especially important that lives be valued correctly.

E

ven if all moral objections are tabled, the
current practice of discounting future
human life cannot be justified even on a
purely economic basis. Within the current
CBA discounting regime, the discount
rate for future lives should be radically reduced for
two reasons, our two arguments. First, the inflation
of health care costs, which are increasing far faster
than the price of other goods and services, indicates
that future generations will exhibit far greater willingness to pay to avoid fatal risks than economists
measure today. Second, modern industrialized societies tend to increase in wealth, meaning that even if
health care does not increase as a portion of the U.S.
gross domestic product, future generations of Americans will be richer than Americans are today, meaning they will have more money to spend avoiding risk
— their lives will be worth more. Combined, these
phenomena cause undervaluation of future human

lives — leading to underestimation of the benefits
of environmental and other regulation, resulting in
needless deaths.
In recent years, rapid health care cost inflation has
captured the attention of American politicians and
scholars. CBA calculations, however, have not considered health inflation when calculating the value
of future lives. Ignoring health inflation undervalues
future lives no matter what discount rate is applied
to future benefits. Accordingly, regardless of whether
agencies should use 3 percent, 7 percent, or some
other number — or even if they should use no discount rate at all, that is, a rate of 0 percent — underestimating the future value of a life saved will cause a
CBA calculation to lowball the present value of that
future benefit.
From 1960 to 2006, health care costs tripled as
a portion of the U.S. gross domestic product, rising
from 5.2 percent to 16 percent of GDP. Since 1980,
health inflation has outpaced general inflation on average by more than 3 percent annually. With Americans devoting a greater percentage of their income
to health care, it would appear that their willingness
to pay to avoid death is rising. In other words, even
in inflation-adjusted dollars, a future American will
likely exhibit a willingness to pay more money to
preserve his health (by, for example, avoiding a risk
of death caused by exposure to workplace contaminants) than Americans do today. Assuming for the
moment that health inflation will continue to outpace general inflation by 3 percent annually over the
coming decade, then someone’s willingness to pay in
2022 can be calculated as follows:
WTP2022 = WTP2012 • 1.03 10 = WTP2012 • 1.34
Accounting for health inflation increases the value
of a 2022 life by more than a third. Substituting a
20-year time period increases the value of a 2032 life
by 81 percent. The resulting future value could then
be discounted to determine its present value. Note,
however, that the closer the discount rate is to the excess health inflation rate, the closer the “real discount
rate” for future lives comes to zero. For example, if
the appropriate discount rate for future benefits is 3
percent per year and health inflation also equals 3
percent per year, then the present value of a human
life, regardless of when in the future that life is saved,
becomes equal to the value of a life saved today. Of
course, one could quibble about the precise numbers
selected, but the point is clear. As long as health care
costs are expected to rise at a rate above general infla-

Copyright © 2012, Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, D.C. www.eli.org.
Reprinted by permission from The Environmental Forum®, November/December 2012.

N O V E M B E R / D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 2 | 27

tion — and an increasing share of GDP devoted to
health care seems widely expected, if not universally
applauded — then current CBA calculations undervalue future lives at least somewhat.
Current CBA discounting often further undervalues future lives because discounters regularly ignore
rising per capita wealth (or, to be more precise, rising
real — that is, inflation-adjusted — per capita income)
in developed countries. Because the willingness to pay
for safety is at least somewhat correlated with wealth,
richer countries should use higher VSLs when assessing
policies. Yet, when valuing the lives of persons saved in
the future, many CBA calculators do not account for
the growth of GDP in excess of inflation and population growth. (Some agencies — such as EPA and the
Department of Transportation — have recently begun
accounting for rising real income, but most agencies
have not done so.) Developed countries, such as the
United States, see increases in real GDP (that is, GDP
adjusted for inflation) nearly every year. Although part
of increased GDP results from population growth, the
United States has enjoyed rising real GDP per capita
for decades, with an annual increase of about 1.8 percent. Accordingly, the economic output of each American rises over time, even in inflation-adjusted dollars.
Gains in output are divided among business profits,
employee wages, and taxation, meaning that almost every year, the average American sees a real increase in the
total money coming from profits (if, for example, he
or she owns shares in for-profit companies), pay, and
government outlays.
Any calculation of a VSL that incorporates willingness to pay for safety or willingness to accept risk
will tend to place greater value on persons with more
disposable money. The reason is simple: Willingness
to pay for goods increases when one has money in
the first place (or at least has access to credit). Only
someone with money can exhibit willingness to part
with it. Conversely, the toleration of harms — such
as dirty air or dangerous working conditions that a
government agency might regulate — in exchange
for money increases with poverty.
A simple example illustrates the principle. If we
assume an annual increase in real per capita GDP of
1.8 percent, then for every $1,000 produced by each
person in the United States today, each American in
10 years will produce $1,195. When the increased
output returns to the economy in profits, wages, and
government outlays, Americans will have that much
more real wealth to spend. All things being equal,
someone in 2022 would pay $1,195 to avoid a risk
that someone would pay $1,000 to avoid today. The
28 | T H E E N V I R O N M E N T A L F O R U M

“wealth-adjusted” value of a 2022 benefit is therefore
19.5 percent greater than the same benefit today, at
least before discounting.
Next, one can apply discounting to these figures. If one ignores increased future wealth and then
imagines a future harm of the kind Americans today
would pay $1,000 to ameliorate, the present value of
removing the future harm in 2022 is equal to
Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate ) Years
which, with a discount rate of 7 percent and a period
of 10 years equals
$1000 / ( 1 + 0.07 )10 = $508
If the future benefit is valued at $1,195 instead of
$1,000 — that is, if the benefit calculation accounts
for the increased wealth of future Americans — then
the value of removing the future harm in 2022 (using
the same discount rate of 7 percent) is equal to
$1,195 / ( 1 + 0.07 )10 = $607
The failure to use income-adjusted willingness to
pay to avoid risk (and “willingness to accept” risk)
figures when calculating the future benefits of health
and safety regulations thereby leads to an undervaluation of about 16 percent for benefits obtained in
2022. For benefits accruing in 20 years, the undervaluation is about 30 percent.
In addition, future Americans will likely devote
at least part of their extra income directly to risk
reduction. One cannot predict with certainty what
wealthier Americans will do with their additional
real dollars. Absent good evidence that no extra cash
will cover safety costs, however, CBA calculators
cannot justify their inattention to future purchasing
power. Especially as the quality of safety technology
improves — which seems nearly certain to occur, at
least for those who can afford it — it would be bizarre for Americans enjoying unprecedented wealth
to skimp on their own safety.
When one combines the effects of health inflation
and income-adjusted future willingness to pay, the undervaluation of future benefits in current CBA practice becomes especially stark. Using the 3 percent figure from above for excess health inflation (that is, the
rate at which health care costs increase above general
inflation) and 1.8 percent for increased real GDP per
capita, the future value of a benefit can be calculated as
follows: The future value of a benefit equals the value
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Americans would assign to the same
benefit available today, multiplied
each year by both 1.03 and 1.018.
The numbers combine for an annual
increase of about 4.85 percent.
Unless CBA calculators can justify their failure to account for health
inflation and increasing per capita
real GDP, they should immediately
begin increasing the estimated value
of future health and safety benefits.
While controversy would remain as
to what discount rate is appropriate
when determining the present value
of such future benefits, a CBA that
correctly values future benefits will
find more accurate present values
for any correctly chosen discount
rate, and current practice arbitrarily
reduces the values of future benefits.
The two simple corrections to
CBA calculations proposed here
would immensely increase the projected monetized benefits of regulations expected to save lives in the
future. By accounting for health inflation and rising real income, policymakers can more easily justify regulations concerning workplace safety,
clean air, clean water, and highway
safety, to name just a few. In particular, the long-term benefits of ameliorating global warming would have
substantially greater monetary value
if properly calculated. Because many
global warming regulations are the
responsibility of EPA, the agency’s
decision to incorporate rising real
per capita income into its CBA is
an important step in the right direction. Without silencing their ethical
and moral critiques of discounting
future human lives, those opposed
to the practice should demand that
if CBA calculations will incorporate
such discounting, they must at least
begin with a proper assessment of the
future value to be discounted, a value
one can accurately find only with a
consideration of health care cost inflation and rising real per capita income. •
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